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Abstract
The State of Washington enacted a school district bond credit enhancement
program in 1999. Oregon did the same in 1998. I use data from the National
Center for Education Statistics for a representative sample of states in order to
examine whether or not these programs increased the likelihood that school
districts in Washington and Oregon issued bonds. I isolate the programs’ impact in
Washington and Oregon through difference-in-differences analysis to control for
other variation in the data in ten other representative states during the same time
period. The results suggest that state-level school district bond guarantee programs
increase the likelihood of district bond issues.
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I. Introduction
Do school district bond guarantee programs matter? Many school districts
engage in capital projects, which can include new schools, additions, renovations,
equipment purchases, etc. They require a significant amount of upfront
investment. Districts usually pursue this type of investment through bond issues.
Any bond issued by a municipal (local) authority is referred to as a “municipal
bond,” and a majority of bonds issued by school districts are General Obligation
Bonds (GO) and voter-approved. GO bonds require municipalities to pledge their
full taxing authority and tax revenues as collateral to repay bondholders. They
often require the municipality to pledge a property tax to meet debt service
requirements.
The typical format is for school districts to pursue bond insurance on their
own with a private insurer. However, several states have introduced different types
of state-run bond insurance programs, including Washington in 1999, and Oregon
in 1998. These programs are the source of my identification, as I use data from the
National Center for Education Statistics for a representative sample of states in
order to examine whether or not these programs increased the likelihood that school
districts in Washington and Oregon issued bonds. I isolate the programs’ impact in
Washington and Oregon through difference-in-differences analysis to control for
other variation in the data in ten other representative states during the same time
period. The results suggest that state-level school district bond guarantee programs
increase the likelihood of district bond issues.
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I begin with a background and literature review in section II, followed by my
empirical strategy in section III, data in section IV, results in section V, and
conclusion in section VI.
II. Background and Related Literature
School districts, as well as any entity that considers issuing bonds, must
decide whether or not to have their bond issue rated. There is a typical cost-benefit
analysis that is at least briefly considered by school district finance officials. There
is no uniform list of reasons why a district should or should not pursue a rating, as
Gist (2009) suggests that bond raters appear to evaluate a wide range of
information during the rating process. Ratings provide a number of benefits to both
the school district and prospective bondholder. They provide valuable independent
analysis of the district’s financial condition to help sell municipal bonds on the
primary market. Ratings are necessary to attract non-local or institutional
investors, as state and federal law restricts their investments to “investment-grade”
securities (Harris 2003).
However, not all school districts will benefit from paying a fee to have their
bond rated. Mary H. Harris and Vincent G. Munley (2002) note that school district
size may be an advantage in a bond rating process, as rating agencies clearly take
the ability of a district’s population to pay taxes into account. If district size
matters, then a smaller district that believes there is a high likelihood that the bond
will receive an unfavorable rating may forgo the process, thereby missing the
opportunity to receive institutional investors’ dollars. The benefits may not
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outweigh the costs for some districts. Another possibility is that a district that does
not expect to have many non-local investors interested in its bond issue may not
need the external validity and approval of a rating issued by an agency in order to
generate appeal amongst local investors. These local investors may already know
enough about the district’s reputation, financial condition, and characteristics to
judge whether or not they are interested in its bond issue on their own.
Poorly performing school districts may also struggle to obtain a favorable
rating. D. Denison, W. Yan, and Z. Zhao (2007) use an ordered probit maximum
likelihood model show that districts that improve the percent of students passing
standardized tests and increase the number of students admitted to college increase
their probability of getting a higher bond credit rating.
However, even if the school district fears receipt of an unfavorable rating
from a rating agency, district officials may decide to go ahead and seek a bond
rating anyway. From 1991-1993, the average rating fee was $7,000, and national
statistics show Moody’s and S&P rate the majority (58 percent) of rated bonds
(Harris 2003). If the district’s fears are confirmed, they then have the option to
purchase bond insurance. Bond insurance represents an additional expense to the
district, adding on to a potentially expensive bond-issue process. Those districts
that do purchase bond insurance almost always receive an upgrade to the highest
rating, as the private insurance agency guarantees the district’s debt obligation for
a fee to the school district. Insurance premiums involve an assessment of the
districts’ financial condition and risk of default (Harris 2003). Todd Ely (2012) finds
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evidence that bond insurance premiums rose dramatically following the 2007-2008
fiscal crisis, even when controlling for widening credit spreads and changes in the
underlying credit quality of issuers. With this in mind, some school districts that
would benefit from purchasing insurance may not be able to do so. This fact
inspires my research question, as the implementation of a state-level bond issue
guarantee changes the landscape for school districts that decide against private
insurance.
There are four categories of state-level bond credit enhancement programs.
The first is State Guarantee Programs, where states pledge their full faith and
credit to qualified school district bonds. The second is State Aid
Intercept/Withholding Programs, where the district’s state-level revenue is diverted
to bondholders in the event of faulty debt servicing. The third is State
Appropriation Programs, where state funds are used to resolve any shortage of
district funds to service debt. The fourth and final category is State Fund
Programs, where dollars from constitutionally created state funds are used to
resolve any shortage of district funds to service debt. Some of these programs
involve a direct link between the state’s rating and the district bond issue’s rating,
while others do not. Table A1 in Appendix A displays the various types of programs
in each state in my dataset, as well as their implementation year.
My paper focuses on Oregon and Washington’s State Guarantee Programs,
where the state pledges its full faith and credit behind qualified district bonds. It is
important to note that my question simply examines whether or not state-level
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school district bond guarantee programs increase the likelihood that a school
district will issue bonds. There is some evidence that districts that pass bond issues
through the referendum process are rewarded with an immediate increase of
housing prices. It suggests that parents value improvements in other types of
school output such as safety and facility quality that might not be captured by test
scores, even after controlling for demographic changes (Cellini et. al 2008). This
evidence suggests that public opinion positively values capital spending. However,
while a wide range of literature examines whether or not capital projects or
increased spending in general improve student outcomes, this paper does not. It
simply examines whether or not state-level bond guarantee programs have any
effect on a school district’s propensity to issue bonds – a simple question that is not
often found in the literature.
III. Empirical Strategy
Do state-level school district bond guarantee programs have any effect on a
school district’s propensity to issue bonds? To answer this question, I could take
one of two approaches: I could focus on the bond rating improvements obtained
through the credit-enhancement program, or I can look for data on bond issues,
regardless of their rating. I chose the latter approach, as most credit enhancement
programs and bond insurance agencies automatically improve the bond issue’s
rating (Harris 2003).
If a state creates a school district bond guarantee program, I can look at
changes in district behavior with regards to bond issues before and after this state-
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level policy change. However, any conclusions from this data alone, local to the
state where the policy change occurred, will simply suggest correlation but not
causation. To overcome this limitation, I examine variation in school district bond
issues inside and outside of the state where the policy change occurred, before and
after the introduction of the bond guarantee program. Ideally, I would use as large
of a sample of school districts as possible – one idea is to gather data for all 50 U.S.
states. However, this idea runs into a few issues, as education climates vary by
state.
With this concern in mind, I decided to use a representative sample of 12 U.S.
states. This list is drawn from research conducted by Mary Harris (2001), as she
explains how these 10 states are a representative sample of different education
system structures, policies, and environments, in different regions of the country.
For example, her selection of states is made in light of different referendum
requirements, debt limit policies, the varying independence of school districts,
voting majority definitions, and various capital state funding practices. The 10
states are: Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, and Oregon. I add Texas and Washington to the sample, as a
majority of the remaining school district bond literature uses Texas data, and I use
Washington as one of my two sources of identification. Texas is large in size and
has a school district bond credit enhancement program (state permanent fund). It
also adopted standardized testing earlier than most states. Although California is a
larger state than Texas with regards to population, California’s public education
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system is subject to unique and unrepresentative circumstances due to the Serrano
court decision.
Table A1 in appendix A lists various types of state-level school district bond
issue credit enhancement programs within my list of sample states. As mentioned
earlier, only Oregon and Washington have bond guarantee programs, where the
state pledges its full faith and credit to qualified school district bonds. These
programs are the source of my identification, as opposed to credit enhancement
programs that fall into other categories, such as those that divert state aid intended
for schools to bondholders in times of financial trouble. However, I also account for
the 2002 enactment of a credit enhancement program in New Jersey with an
additional dummy variable, even though it is structured differently than a bond
guarantee program. Kentucky’s 2004 program only applies to Universities, and
therefore has no impact on my estimates.
If the number of school districts that issue bonds after the introduction of a
bond guarantee program increases, after controlling for unobserved variation
through an analysis of a representative sample of states, this suggests that the
bond guarantee program changes the financial possibilities for school districts and
increases their propensity to raise funds for capital projects through bond issues. If
the number of school districts that issue bonds after the program’s introduction falls
with the controls included, then the bond guarantee program likely has a negative
effect on a district’s propensity to raise funds through bond issues.
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I develop a model to evaluate the effect of Washington and Oregon’s school
district bond guarantee programs, according to the following specification:

Equation 1:

My dependent variable, BONDISSUE, is a binary outcome variable of 0 or 1,
where 1 represents a district bond issue, and 0 represents no issue. My first
independent variable is BONDINS, a dummy variable equal to 1 for all Washington
school districts from 1999 - 2009 and Oregon school districts from 1998 - 2009, and
0 for all other states and years. This uniquely identifies the policy change that
serves as my identification. I expect BONDINS to be positively correlated with
BONDISSUE because the state-level school district bond guarantee programs in
Washington and Oregon simplify the bond issue process and improve financial
opportunities for school districts in an intuitive and theoretical interpretation. The
other dummy variable, NJQBP, simply accounts for the existence of a state fund
program in New Jersey from 2002 – 2009 for all school districts in the state.
The third independent variable is a vector X, that includes PWHITE, which is
equal to the percent of enrolled students whose race is “white,” ENROLL, equal to
the total number of enrolled students in the district, LTE - an acronym for local tax
effort represented by local revenue per student divided by per capita personal
income (both components adjusted for inflation), INGVTPP - an acronym for inter9

governmental revenue per pupil or total per pupil revenue to each district from
state and federal sources (adjusted for inflation), and GROSSDEBT, equal to long
and short term debt outstanding at the end of the year divided by ENROLL
(adjusted for inflation). I expect PWHITE to be positively correlated with
BONDISSUE, as I assume a majority of school districts that issue bonds are in
strong financial standing and of higher quality. I use PWHITE to proxy for this
expectation. I anticipate a positive correlation between ENROLL and
BONDISSUE, as Harris (2003) suggests that larger districts receive higher ratings
due to a perceived larger tax base, population, and tax revenue generation ability. I
expect LTE and INGVTPP to be negatively correlated with BONDISSUE, as
districts with higher local tax revenues likely have less need of additional revenue,
and districts with large amounts of state and federal aid likely have less need of
alternative sources of additional revenue. Lastly, I anticipate a negative
relationship between GROSSDEBT and BONDISSUE, as I imagine that districts
with high amounts of outstanding debt will acknowledge the likelihood that this
financial position will be penalized through the bond ratings they may receive on a
new issue.
There are also dummy variables for each year (δ t ), which are dummies for all

years of sufficient data (excluding the first year, 1997) across all observations and
variables from 1998-2009: δ 1 (1998) + δ 2 (1999) + … + δ 12 (2009). I also include

district fixed effects (γ i ) to impose time-independent effects for each district that

could be correlated with the independent variables. By using fixed effects, I am
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able to incorporate difference in differences analysis into my evaluation of this
policy change in Oregon and Washington.
I estimate equation 1 using two different econometric frameworks. First, I
use OLS in model I with a linear probability model. 1 The second framework (model
II) involves a maximum log-likelihood model. Both the OLS and Logistic
regressions are modeled using fixed-effects. This controls for between-district
variation, and allows me to isolate the within-district variation in whether or not a
district issued bonds. All results are reported in Appendix B.
IV. Data
Ideally, data used to answer this question include a) whether or not school
districts issued bonds in a large sample of years before and after Washington and
Oregon’s policy changes b) some demographic variables c) some financial variables,
especially those that concern the district’s ability to raise revenue in other ways or
its receipt of large amounts of revenue from other branches of government and d)
some economic variables, such as household income for the town each school district
is in.
I obtained a majority of my data from the National Center for Education
Statistics, a division of the U.S. Department of Education. I also retrieved per
capita personal income by county and GDP deflator data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. I used the GDP deflator to adjust several figures for inflation,
In unreported regression results, I then use this the same linear probability model with standard
errors clustered by state, to ensure robustness and to identify the variation at the state-level. It is
not evident that clustering significantly improved the results – if anything, it strengthens
BONDINS’ impact on BONDISSUE, whereas we would expect clustered standard errors to result in
a weaker effect. The standard errors did not change much with clustering.
1
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as I compare them over time. Additionally, I calculated some variables used in the
final regression using the retrieved NCES data. Sufficient data exists across all
variables of interest for 1997-2009. Per capita personal income (used in LTE) is by
county, not by town - this is one limitation of the dataset.
Summary statistics for the variables used in all regression analyses are
displayed below in table A2 of appendix A. Figure 1 in Appendix A displays the
mean of the binary BONDISSUE variable for the two states of interest and the rest
of the states in the sample from 1997-2009. It appears that the program had a
slightly lagged effect on the probability that school districts issue bonds. Further
research could examine the decline after 2003.
V. Results
I estimate equation 1 using two different econometric frameworks. First, I
use a linear probability model (OLS). The second framework involves a logit model.
Results for the OLS panel regression (model I) are displayed in Table B1 in
Appendix B. These coefficient results suggest that Washington and Oregon’s bond
guarantee programs (BONDINS) increase the probability of a district bond issue by
almost 77 percent (I divide the estimated coefficient of 0.0686 by the sample mean
of 0.0895). This is consistent with my expectation that the bond guarantee
programs result in a positive increase in the likelihood that a school district in
Washington or Oregon issues bonds.
Results for the logistic regression (model II) are displayed in Table B1 in
Appendix B. Coefficients are instead reported as an “odds-ratio.” Odds represent
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the expected number of “successes” for each “failure.” Districts with the
Washington and Oregon state-level bond guarantee programs available were 86
percent more likely to issue bonds.
The linear probability model (model I) estimates a slightly smaller effect of
BONDINS than the logistic regression (model II). It is difficult to compare the two
models in detail, as ordinary least squares and logistic regression differ. For
example, OLS requires homoscedasticity, while logistic regression does not. It
appears that model II estimates a slightly larger effect, but regardless, both the
OLS linear probability model and the logistic regression estimate a positive and
significant effect of Washington and Oregon’s bond guarantee programs on the
propensity of school districts to issue bonds. This effect persists after controlling for
unobserved underlying changes before and after the programs across a
representative sample of ten other states. District size (as measured by school
enrollment) does not seem to have a significant effect, nor does non-local revenue for
the OLS model.
VI. Conclusions
I use two fixed-effect models (OLS and Logit) with the same specification to
examine the impact of Washington and Oregon’s school district bond guarantee
programs on the likelihood that a school district issues bonds. I control for
unobserved variation in a representative sample of ten other states before and after
the program’s inception in Oregon in 1998 and Washington in 1999. My analysis to
estimate the effect of these bond guarantee programs involves difference-in-
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differences analysis and suggests that the programs have a positive and significant
effect on the likelihood that school districts issue bonds after their inception. The
programs’ positive and significant effect is robust across both the panel data OLS
regression and the panel data logistic regression.
Future research could make use of district-level income data instead of
county-level data. Additional research on these programs could also examine their
effects on the actual ratings assigned to Washington and Oregon’s school districts’
bond issues. This would involve collecting rating data for each school district in
each state before and after 1999 (1998).
Overall, my estimates suggest a positive outcome for school districts in
Washington and Oregon, if the reader assumes that increased capital spending
through bond issuance is a desirable outcome for school districts, in accordance with
the evidence presented by Cellini et all (2008). Other states could use this finding
to support the potential gains from a school district bond guarantee program – a
state-level alternative to private bond insurance. Since most state-level bond
insurance programs guarantee district voter-approved issues, they are likely more
generous than private insurers, on average. Some may find this policy outcome
desirable.
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Appendix A:
Table A1: Various State Municipal Bond Programs in Sample States
Type
Year
State Guarantee Programs:
Oregon School Bond Guarantee Program
1998
Washington School Bond Guarantee Program
1999
State Aid Intercept/Withholding Programs:
Georgia State Aid Intercept Program
Kentucky State Aid Intercept Program
Kentucky State Aid Intercept Program for Commonwealth
Universities

1991
1994
2004

State Fund Programs:
Pre-1990
New Jersey Additional State Aid Bonds Program
New Jersey Fund for the Support of the Free Public Schools Program
1980
New Jersey Qualified Bond Program
2002
Texas Permanent School Fund Program
1983
Texas Higher Education Bond Program
1985
Sources: Standard & Poor's State Credit Enhancement Programs, November 2008.
Stone & Youngberg Municipal Credit Group, March 2011

Variable
bondissue
bondins
njqbp
pwhite
enroll
lte
ingvtpp
grossdebt

Table A2: Summary Statistics for All Variables
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min Max
62608
0.2047342
0.4035105
0
1
62608
0.0895572
0.2855487
0
1
62608
0.0661257
0.2485037
0
1
62608
0.6963163
0.295723
0
2.8
62608
2924.025
10115.27
1
477610
62608
0.1599459
0.166088
0
5.107666
62608
6442.476
5862.402
0
756720.9
62608
4643.033
6687.195
0
426343.5
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Appendix B:
Table B1: Regression Results for Models I and II
Model I (LPM)
Model II (Logit)
Coefficient
Coefficient
Odds Ratio
bondins
0.0686***
0.622***
1.863***
(0.0142)
(0.108)
(0.202)
njqbp
-0.0539***
-0.476***
0.621***
(0.00958)
(0.0935)
(0.0581)
pwhite
0.117***
1.698***
5.461***
(0.0291)
(0.314)
(1.712)
enroll
0.00000171
0.0000189
1
(0.00000149)
(0.0000125)
(0.0000125)
lte
-0.0520**
-1.049***
0.350***
(0.0204)
(0.263)
(0.092)
ingvtpp
-1.25E-08
-2.49e-05***
1.000***
(0.000000321)
(0.00000901) (0.00000901)
grossdebt
1.54e-05***
0.000167***
1.000***
(0.000000328)
(0.00000395) (0.00000395)
Constant
0.0862***
N/A
N/A
(0.0227)
Observations
62608
45121
45121
Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Difference in observations due to multiple positive outcomes
within groups encountered in -xtlogit-. 1968 groups (17487 obs)
dropped in Model II because of all positive or all negative outcomes.
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